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I. INTRODUCTION
Many frustrations result as a consequence of a legal system which
is composed of many adjudicatory tribunals that consistently reach
diverse conclusions about similar problems. If these problems are not of
sufficient importance in the total complex of -societal transactions to
warrant a single authoritative determination by either the Supreme
Court or the Congress, then the necessity that the inferior tribunals find
some common rationale becomes magnified. And in addition, if the area
in which the problem is found is one in which planning of future activity
at the primary stage may depend on the conclusions reached by a court
in reference to the legal effect of the transaction, the problem becomes
acute. This appears to be the present situation in those cases in which
a buyer or group of buyers uses a close corporation to pay the purchase
price of the corporate business entity.
Anomaly Incorporated is owned by Harold Grab and Sidney Gim-
mee. Each owns fifty of the one hundred shares of outstanding capital
* Member of the Florida Bar; Attorney in the Department of Justice, Tax Division;
B.S., University of Pennsylvania, 1959; LL.B., University of Miami, 1962; LL.M., Harvard
Law School, 1963; formerly Editor-in-Chief of the University of Miami Law Review. The
views expressed herein represent those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of
the Department of Justice.
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stock of the corporation. The corporation produces abusives. That it
has been quite successful in this endeavor is indicated by the following
financial statements:
BALANCE SHEET
As of December 31, 1963
ASSETS OWNERS' EQUITY
Cash $50,000 Capital Stock $ 1,000
Machinery 50,000 Earned Surplus 99,000
Total Assets $100,000 Total Owners' Equity $100,000






After five years of being together Grab and Gimmee are having
difficulties. They cannot decide whether to sell the business to Samson
Friendly or whether one of them should sell his interest to the other.
The difficulty with either solution is that Friendly, Grab and Gimmee
have no personal funds with which to make the purchase. Therefore, they
are considering the possibility of having the corporation buy them out
through a stock redemption.' They are aware of the favorable tax con-
sequences that will devolve upon the party whose shares are redeemed if
he terminates his entire interest in the corporation.2 However, they are
not quite certain what tax effect the transaction will have on the remaining
or purchasing shareholder.' An effort will be made in this paper to set
forth rational lines of demarcation as to the federal tax consequences to
the remaining shareholder or shareholders in transactions of this nature.
A. The Alternatives
There are several basic approaches to the solution of the Grab-
Gimmee problem." The book value of the stock is 1,000 dollars per
1. Generally, the corporate codes permit a corporation to redeem its own shares out of
"surplus." Although difficulties arise as to what constitutes "surplus," in the situation
presented there is sufficient earned surplus from which the redemption can be made. It is
generally recognized that earned surplus is one of the components of "surplus." E.g., ABA-
ALl MODEL Bus. COaP. AcT § 5 (1961).
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b) (3) [hereinafter all references to sections shall be
to sections in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, unless otherwise indicated]. Assuming, of
course, that the stock was a capital asset in the hands of the shareholder.
3. The shareholder who owns stock in the corporation after the completion of the
purchase will be denominated as the purchasing (buying) or remaining shareholder through-
out this paper.
4. There are various methods in which the transaction may be effected. See, e.g., First,
Use of Corporate Funds to Buy Out Shareholders-Acquisitions by Third Parties, N.Y.U.
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share. The approximate average earnings of the corporation is 20,000
dollars per year. Capitalized at a conservative rate of twenty per cent, the
business is worth 100,000 dollars.5 It is unlikely that there is a sub-
stantial market for the stock, so that fair market value would be difficult,
if not impossible, to ascertain on the basis of a going price for the cor-
porate shares. It would appear reasonable to conclude that fifty shares
of stock are worth 50,000 dollars.
Assuming that Grab decided to buy out Gimmee he could accomplish
this in several ways, depending, of course, upon Gimmee's acquiescence
in the plan.
(1) The simplest approach would appear to be to have the cor-
poration redeem Gimmee's stock for 50,000 dollars. Gimmee would have
his interest in the corporation completely terminated by the redemption
and would therefore recognize capital gain on the transaction.6
(2) The corporation could redeem the stock owned by Gimmee for
a total price of 50,000 dollars, but instead of paying cash it could give
its own notes, payable annually from 1964; the face amount of each
note would be 10,000 dollars with interest at five per cent. Assuming
that the fair market value of the notes was 50,000 dollars, Gimmee would
realize capital gain to the extent of the difference between his basis in
the stock and the purchase price.7
If Grab and Gimmee decided to sell the business to Friendly they
could accomplish this by:
(3) selling Friendly five shares of stock for 5,000 dollars and then
having the corporation redeem the remainder of their stock for 95,000
dollars. Because the corporation has only 50,000 dollars in cash, it would
have to borrow the additional 45,000 dollars from either the vendors or
an independent source. It could pay Grab and Gimmee 50,000 dollars
and give them notes for the remaining 45,000 dollar balance payable annu-
ally; each note would have a face value of 9,000 dollars and would bear
a five per cent interest rate. The first payment would be due in December
1964.
(4) The corporation could borrow 45,000 dollars from a bank with
repayment to be made annually at the rate of 9,000 dollars a year; the
notes would bear a five per cent interest rate with the first payment due
in December 1964.
12TH INST. ON FED. TAx 191 (1954) ; Redlich, The Sale of a Closely-Held Corporate Business,
9 TAx L. REV. 354 (1954) ; Note, 67 YALE L.J. 112 (1957). However, the methods discussed
in this section are limited to those which will help illustrate the basic thesis presented in this
article.
5. I DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONs 390 (5th ed. 1953).
6. See note 2 supra. ,
7. Ibid. See generally 4 CCH 1963 STAND. FED. TAX Rup. 1 4400.
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In examples three and four the vendors would' obtain capital gain
treatment on the difference between the basis of their shares and the total
purchase price received.
8
Assuming that the sales and redemptions in all four cases were com-
pleted in December 1963, the vendors would realize capital gain for that
taxable year. The differences in the transactions would not alter their
federal tax consequences. The problem that remains is whether the trans-
actions should give rise to any taxable income to the remaining or pur-
chasing shareholders in any of the four cases. And if so, which ones, to
what extent and why?
II. THE EXISTING STATE OF THE LAW
This section of the article will be devoted to a consideration of what
the law appears to be at present with reference to the tax liability of the
remaining or purchasing shareholders. This is intended to afford a back-
drop to a later discussion of what the law ought to be.
A. The "Obligation" Criterion
The most completely developed area relating to the tax liability
of the remaining or purchasing shareholders can be found in those situ-
ations in which the purchaser or remaining shareholder has obligated him-
self in his personal capacity for the price of the shares being sold. Once
he has taken this step he seems to be headed down a path of doom. If the
shareholder has the corporation redeem stock from him so that he can
use the funds to pay the obligation he has incurred for the price of the
shares, the distribution he receives will be considered "essentially equiv-
alent to a dividend."9 Prior to the passage of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, this transaction presented no complications with reference to the sta-
tutory language, because the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 merely pro-
vided that distributions in redemption of stock, if essentially equivalent to
a dividend, were to be taxed as a dividend.'" However, the 1954 Code has
raised some new problems in that the statute provides that if its specific
requirements are met" the distribution in redemption is to be treated as
one "in exchange" for the stock. 2 Thus, the distribution could lose its
dividend equivalence even though in payment of an obligation of the
shareholder. 3
8. In example (3) the sale of the stock to Friendly would give rise to capital gains and
the redemption would also produce capital gains. The same would be true for example (4).
See §§ 1222, 302(b) (3).
9. Lowenthal v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1948); Wall v. United States,
164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947) ; Thomas, J. French, 26 T.C. 263 (1956) ; George M. Hancock,
18 T.C. 210 (1952).
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 115(g), ch. 2, 53 Stat. 48 (1939) [hereinafter all refer-
ences to § 115(g) are to the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1939].
11. E.g., § 302(b) (3).
12. Section 302(a).
13. See II(A) (2) of this article's text infra.
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Dividend consequences may devolve upon the shareholder-purchaser
if he: (1) borrows money from the corporation to pay the purchase price
of the stock he has acquired and then has some of his stock redeemed in
return for a cancellation of his indebtedness; 14 or (2) if he assigns his
rights under the contract of purchase to the corporation and thereby has
the corporation redeem the seller's stock directly. 5 It would seem, at
first blush, that the considerations which would predicate dividend equiv-
alence should be different depending on which of the methods was adopted.
Thus, if there was a redemption of stock and a cancellation of indebted-
ness, the determination would revolve around the criteria which have
developed in determining whether a redemption is essentially equivalent
to a dividend.' 6 If the shareholder assigned his rights in the contract of
sale and had the corporation assume the obligation to pay for the pur-
chased shares, factors other than those pertinent to redemptions should,
at least, be considered in the first instance. When a shareholder assigns
to a corporation his right to an asset and the corporation assumes the
debt on the asset, the payments do not necessarily constitute dividend in-
come to the shareholder." Admittedly, there is an easy distinction between
the situation in which a shareholder assigns his right in an asset to the
corporation and the assignment of the right to acquire the stock of the
assignee-corporation.' 8 Further, the court may be looking through the
transaction in which the shareholder assigns his right to purchase the
corporate stock, so that what it would see after the bubble has burst is
nothing more than a redemption by the corporation from the purchasing
shareholder. This situation would make the same criteria relevant,
whether the transaction was a cancellation of indebtedness with a re-
demption, or an assignment of a contract right to purchase the corporate
stock with an assumption of the liability which arose under the contract.
However, even though there is a plausible theory which supports a finding
of dividend income in both situations, the courts have failed to consider
the problem, or if they have, it has been done sub rosa.
14. Thomas J. French, 26 T.C. 263 (1956).
15. Schalk Chem. Co., 32 T.C. 879 (1959).
16. If the transaction was under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the applicable
section would be 115(g), whereas under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 302 would
control. If the transaction fell within § 302(b) (1), then the criteria for determining dividend
equivalence would be similar to those applied under § 115(g). Thomas G. Lewis, 35 T.C.
71 (1960). For a discussion of these criteria see Nolan, The Uncertain Tax Treatment of
Stock Redemptions: A Legislative Proposal, 65 HAav. L. REv. 255 (1951).
17. Stout v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1959). In this case there was an
assignment of stock in a corporation wholly owned by the shareholders of the assignee-
corporation. The stock was not fully paid at the time of the assignment. Payment by the
assignee did not constitute a distribution to the assignor-shareholders. See also Easson v.
Commissioner, 294 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1961) (one of the alternative arguments considered
by the court).
18. The treasury stock of a close corporation should not be considered an asset. But see
Schalk Chem. Co., 32 T.C. 879 (1959). When a corporation makes payments on an obligation
incurred to purchase a piece of equipment it is building an equity in that equipment; when
it makes payments on treasury stock it is building nothing of value to itself.
1963]
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Although the broad proposition, that there are dividend consequences
to remaining shareholders when the corporation satisfies their obligations
on the purchase price of the corporate stock, is simple to state, an under-
standing cf its application by the courts is somewhat more difficult.
Sometimes the courts seem preoccupied with the substance of the trans-
action-Was the net effect a redemption of the corporate stock? At
other times there is a preoccupation with the formalities-Did the pur-
chaser obligate himself to purchase the stock? The answer may depend
on the question; and there seems to be no consistency as to which question
will be asked. 19
1. THE DEFENSES
The remaining shareholder has attempted to establish various coun-
ter-arguments to a finding of dividend income in those transactions in
which he was foolish enough, or at times compelled by circumstances, to
obligate himself to pay the purchase price of the selling shareholder's
stock.
a. The Conduit Theory
If the remaining shareholder can establish to the satisfaction of the
finder of fact that in obligating himself to purchase the selling share-
holder's stock he was acting only as an agent for the corporation, and
that in reality it was the corporation that was redeeming the stock from
the seller, he will not incur dividend income when the corporation subse-
quently pays his obligation by redemption of the stock.2 0 This trans-
action presents itself in two basic forms. Suppose that Grab and Gimmee
decide that the corporation should buy Gimmee's shares. Gimmee wants
the cash immediately, but the corporation does not have sufficient surplus
to buy its own stock. 21 Grab may either obligate himself for the purchase
price and pay a part in cash, giving notes for the remainder, or he may
borrow the necessary funds or use his own resources to make an im-
mediate cash payment. Subsequently the corporation earns a sufficient
surplus from which it can redeem the Gimmee-stock, now owned by
Grab. In the first case Grab will assign his rights under the contract of
purchase and the corporation will assume his obligation on the notes.
In the second case the corporation will redeem the purchased shares
from Grab and Grab will use the funds to replenish his own resources or
19. Compare George Youell, 18 B.T.A. 599 (1929), with Ruphane B. Iverson, 29 B.T.A.
863 (1934) (dissenting opinion).
[A] closer scrutiny of the case will show nothing more than an awkward attempt
between two honest but uninformed men, acting under poor advice, to sever the
joint ownership of property which their toil had built up, in a way to leave
each in possession and ownership of his own part. A superficial view of the case
shows only the method used by them; a deeper view discloses the true intent
and purpose to do that which no statute ever intended or attempted to tax.
Ruphane B. Iverson, supra at 870.
20. Fox v. Harrison, 145 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1944) ; George R. Beggs, 20 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 626 (1961).
21. See note 1 supra.
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to pay the debt he incurred when he made the purchase. In either case
if the court finds as a fact that he was acting only as an agent for the
corporation when he made the purchase, he will be considered as having
received no income when the redemption takes place.2
Many taxpayers have attempted to make use of this theory as an
afterthought. Generally, their efforts have been of no avail.2 In order
to establish that the remaining shareholder was acting only as an agent
for the corporation he should, at least, be able to prove that: (1) prior
to the transaction there was formal authorization by the corporation for
the shareholder to act in its behalf; 4 (2) if there was no prior authori-
zation there was at least a subsequent ratification by the corporation of
the purchase of the shares in its behalf; (3) if he used some of his own
funds in payment of part of the purchase price there is a corporate liability
to him for this amount; 25 (4) the corporation was a party to the contract
of sale; and (5) the corporate minutes reflect that the purchase was made
on behalf of the corporation .2  At best this is a dangerous defense to rely
upon and because it appears relatively easy to avoid the consequences of
obligating oneself to purchase the selling shareholder's stock, it is not
a sound planning device.
The taxpayer has proved successful in a recent decision in the Tax
Court in which the government sought to use the conduit theory as a
sword. In Milton F. Priester,27 the taxpayer was one of two shareholders
of a corporation. He entered into a contract with the other shareholder
to purchase her entire interest. The total purchase price was 100,000
dollars. He could not meet the obligation on the contract when it came
due. In order to avoid a breach, he contacted a third party who was
willing to buy the stock if he could be assured that it would be redeemed
at 113,000 dollars in not less than six months. The seller agreed to allow
the third party to take over the taxpayer's obligation and the third
party then purchased the shares for 100,000 dollars. As part of the trans-
action the taxpayer agreed that the corporation would redeem within the
stipulated period. The taxpayer pledged his own shares as security for
the guaranty of redemption. When the corporation redeemed the stock
the government contended that this was a constructive dividend to the
22. Compare Schalk Chem. Co., 32 T.C. 879 (1959), with Fox v. Harrison, 145 F.2d
521 (7th Cir. 1944), and Erickson v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 521 (S.D. Ill. 1960).
23. Lowenthal v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1948); E. H. Stolz, 30 T.C.
530 (1958) ; Thomas J. French, 26 T.C. 263 (1956).
24. Mendle Silverman, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 527 (1954) (the distribution was found
to be essentially equivalent to a dividend). See also Schalk Chem. Co., 32 T.C. 879 (1959).
The taxpayers argued that they were acting in behalf of the corporation notwithstanding
the fact that pursuant to a trust agreement they could not act for the corporation.
25. See George M. Hancock, 18 T.C. 210 (1952).
26. See generally Mendle Silverman, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 527 (1954).
27. 38 T.C. No. 36 (May 29, 1962). See also Neiderkrome v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d
238 (9th Cir. 1959), on remand, 19 CCH Tax Ct; Mem. 459 (1960); cf. Aloysius J. McGinty,
38 T.C. No. 89 (Sept. 17, 1962). But see note 31 infra.
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taxpayer. The Tax Court, however, held that there were no dividend con-
sequences to the taxpayer. They rationalized this conclusion on the
ground that the third party was not an agent of the taxpayer. The dis-
tribution did not relieve the taxpayer of his obligation on the prior con-
tract of sale, because the seller had relieved him of this obligation when
the third party agreed to make the purchase. This reasoning seems to
overlook the fact that the third party only agreed to purchase on the
condition that the corporation would redeem within a certain period of
time. The ratio decidendi of the dissent is more in accord with the realities
of the transaction:
[Taxpayer] certainly received financial and economic benefits
measured by the corporate funds used to relieve him of his
obligation to [the vendor] . . . despite the interposition of
. . . [the third party]. The net effect was a taxable dividend
to ... [the taxpayer] .28
Thus, although the conduit theory may not be a very effective shield
for the taxpayer, particularly when it is nothing more than an after-
thought, it does not appear to be much of a sword for the government.
The Priester decision seems to afford an easy solution to the difficulties
confronting the taxpayer who obligates himself to purchase the shares
of another shareholder, when he later decides to have the corporation pay
for the purchase. So long as he can find somebody willing to earn a gross
interest rate 9 and, in addition, who only has to pay tax at a capital gains
rate on the money earned,8" he should be in a position to accomplish a
result similar to that in Priester.
Again, however, this type of transaction could be avoided at the
inception if the purchaser does not obligate himself to pay the purchase
price. This is the best path to pursue. The use of a third party to over-
come the dividend consequences of the assumption or payment of the
remaining shareholder's obligation for the purchase price of stock is a
dangerous technique."
28. Milton F. Priester, 38 T.C. No. 36 (May 29, 1962).
29. In the Priester case, assuming the money was borrowed for a year, the corporation
paid interest at the rate of 13%.
30. Since the transaction was given the effect the parties intended, the third party had
his entire interest in the corporation terminated. Thus, he met the requisite of § 302(b) (3)
and, therefore, the redemption was an "exchange" within § 302(a). If the stock was a
capital asset in his hands he would receive capital gain treatment on the transaction.
31. Cf. Edgar S. Idol, 38 T.C. No. 47 (June 27, 1962). In this case the taxpayer had
agreed to purchase all the corporate stock. He was obligated for the purchase price of
$112,500. C corporation wished to purchase some of the assets of the corporation. The
taxpayer sold C corporation some of his stock. As part of the contract it was agreed that
the corporation would redeem this stock in exchange for the assets that C corporation
sought to purchase. The taxpayer used the money he received for his stock from C corpora-
tion to pay part of the obligation he owed on the $112,500 purchase price. The Tax Court
-held that C corporation, in effect, purchased the assets from the corporation and that the
corporation distributed the cash received to the taxpayer. This distribution constituted a
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b. The Interposition of a Corporation to Avoid the Consequences
of the Obligation Theory
A taxpayer who desires to purchase the stock of a corporation, but
who is without sufficient personal funds, may be able to borrow the funds
and have the purchased corporation repay the loan without incurring
the dividend consequences inherent in this type of transaction.82 But
this approach seems unlikely. An alternative would be to incorporate and
have the new corporation borrow sufficient funds to make the purchase.
The new corporation can then be merged by statute into the purchased
corporation. The purchased corporation will assume all the obligations of
the constituent corporation. 3 The question then raised is whether sub-
sequent payments on the loans incurred to make the purchase create
dividend consequences to the taxpayer. This appears to be nothing more
than a circuitous route to avoid having the purchased corporation assume
the obligation of the purchaser-taxpayer. However, if the new corporation
is bona fide and not created as a sham to avoid the implications of the
asumption of obligation theory, there will be no dividend income to the
taxpayer. 4 The new corporation should: (1) adhere to all the formalities
of corporate existence; (2) engage in some business activity other than
that of a holding company; and (3) remain in existence for a period of
time longer than it takes to go through the procedure of incorporation and
merger, i.e., at least one year. In addition, the taxpayer should avoid
making himself unconditionally liable as an accommodation party on
the obligations of the new corporation.85 By using this technique the tax-
payer would be putting himself in a vulnerable position, because the
question of whether the corporation is a sham is one of fact. Further, it
may be difficult to find a business in which the new corporation may
engage other than that of holding the purchased corporation's stock.
taxable dividend. See also Ferro v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1957) (discussion
of this case can be found in the text accompanying note 41 infra).
32. See II(A) (1) (a) of this article's text supra.
33. The corporate merger statute may force the surviving corporation to assume the
acquired corporation's obligation as a matter of law. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT § 69(e) (1961).
34. Arthur J. Kobacker, 37 T.C. 882 (1962).
35. In Arthur J. Kobacker, supra note 34, one of the taxpayers had signed a corporate
obligation as an accommodation party in the following manner: "By this endorsement I
hereby guarantee payment of any unpaid balance of the within note plus accrued interest
on maturity date." (Emphasis added.) The court assumed this was a conditional liability
and, therefore, held that the purchased corporation had not assumed the taxpayer's obliga-
tion. This overlooks the fact that if this indorsement made him a guarantor of payment his
obligation would be the same as the unconditional obligation of the corporation. Thus,
if a transaction similar to the one in Kobacker is being planned it would be best to make
sure that the taxpayer was no more than a guarantor of collection on any of the corpora-
tion's obligations. See Annot., 84 A.L.R. 289 (1933); 24 AM. JUR. Guaranty §§ 16, 17
(1939).
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c. Liquidated Damages Theory
A contract of purchase may provide that the purchaser will pay
25,000 dollars immediately and the remaning 20,000 dollars due on the
purchase price of the stock at some future date; if the purchaser fails
to pay the remainder he shall forfeit the 25,000 dollars down payment
and lose his right to the shares. Suppose the purchaser then assigns to
the corporation his right to receive the stock and the corporation assumes
his obligation to pay the 20,000 dollars he still owes. Does a subsequent
payment of this obligation by the corporation constitute a dividend to
him? The Tax Court has held that it does." This type of provision does
not give the purchaser an option to purchase; 87 it merely restricts the
remedy for breach of the agreement. Thus, the obligation to pay the
remainder of the purchase price was binding on the purchaser. Since
the corporation paid his obligation, the payment constitutes a constructive
dividend.
However, the Internal Revenue Service has ruled that when an agree-
ment provides that upon the death of one of two shareholders, the other
must purchase his stock at its fair market value or vote a dissolution of
the corporation within six months, a subsequent redemption of the stock
of one of the shareholders after his demise does not relieve the remaining
shareholder of an obligation.8  "[A]t no time did .. . [the remaining
shareholder] purchase the redeemed shares or obligate himself to do
so .... ," Thus, there were no dividend consequences to the remaining
shareholder. This rationale seems to suggest that if there is a liquidated
damages provision in the contract the purchaser will be considered obli-
gated nonetheless. But if the agreement provides in the alternative that
the purchaser must buy the shares or perform some other act, even if it
be a requirement that he dissolve the corporation, he will not be consid-
ered obligated to purchase the shares.4 0 Certainly when he has a choice of
purchase or liquidation, he is obligated to do one or the other. The fact
that he did neither without breaching the agreement would suggest that
his obligation was satisfied from another source. Why then should the
satisfaction not constitute a dividend to him?
d. The "Indian Giver"
A unique situation was presented in Ferro v. Commissioner.4' Pur-
suant to a plan of liquidation, the three shareholders surrendered all the
stock to the corporation. In order that the business might continue to
36. Schalk Chem. Co., 32 T.C. 879 (1959); cf. Television Indus. Inc., 32 T.C. 1297
(1959), aff'd, 284 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1960).
37. Cf. Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1958).
38. Rev. Rul. 59-286, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 103.
39. Id. at 104.
40. See Lloyd H. Diehl, 1 T.C. 139 (1942).
41. 242 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1957).
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operate, they agreed to allow the taxpayer, who was one of the share-
holders, to purchase all of the stock from the corporation. Because one
of the other former shareholders had surrendered a substantial owner-
ship, the taxpayer agreed to compensate him for his interest. When the
corporation began to prosper, the former shareholder agreed to accept
20,000 dollars as satisfaction of the taxpayer's debt. The taxpayer con-
veyed stock of the corporation worth 20,000 dollars to the former share-
holder. This stock was immediately redeemed by the corporation. Viewing
the transaction as a whole, the court found that the taxpayer was the sole
shareholder both before and after the transaction, thereby resulting in
the proportionate interests remaining unchanged. Corporate money having
been used to discharge an obligation of the taxpayer, the effect was
essentially equivalent to a dividend.
2. A SPECIAL PROBLEM CREATED BY THE 1954 CODE
Section 302 (b)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 may make
it difficult for the courts to find a constructive dividend when there is a
cancellation of indebtedness (rather than an assumption of the pur-
chaser's obligation) by the corporation on a loan made to the taxpayer
to enable him to pay for purchased shares. Assume that A owns ten
shares and B owns ninety shares of the outstanding stock of a corpo-
ration. Because A has been devoting more time to the business it is
agreed that A's percentage interest should be increased to one-third. How-
ever, at this time the corporation does not have sufficient surplus out of
which to redeem a part of B's shares.42 Therefore, A enters into a contract
to purchase forty shares from B. He borrows sufficient cash from the
corporation to pay for twenty-five shares and uses his own funds to pay
for the other fifteen shares. When the corporation earns a sufficient sur-
plus, it redeems twenty-five shares from A in return for a cancellation
of his debt. This redemption would meet the specific requirements of
section 302 (b) (2) and, therefore, it would be considered "in exchange"
for A's stock. 48 Because the shares were exchanged at a price equal
to their adjusted basis there would be no gain recognized on the ex-
change. 4 Even if gain were to be recognized it would be taxed at
capital gains rates. A would now own one-third of the corporation. Ad-
mittedly, this device could not be used if the two shareholders wished to
equalize their ownership,4" but there may be situations, such as this one,
where equalization is not desired.
Under section 115 (g) of the 1939 Code, there were no specific criteria
for determining how disproportionate a redemption had to be for it to
42. See note 1 supra.
43. Section 302(a); cf. Rev. Rul. 57-353, 1957-2 Cum. BUL.. 223.
44. A has just purchased the 25 shares from B. He borrowed enough from the corpora-
tion to pay the purchase price of these shares. His debt to the corporation, therefore, equals
the basis of his stock. Thus, there will be no gain on the redemption.
45. Section 302(b) (2) (B).
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qualify as not equivalent to a dividend.46 Thus, the above illustration
could create dividend consequences under section 115(g) without doing
violence to the statutory language. However, the 1954 Code created a new
problem. A transaction within section 302(b) (2) would certainly force
the courts to face the problem of whether a redemption in cancellation
of an indebtedness presents considerations that differ materially from
those involved in an assumption of a purchaser's liability on a contract to
purchase the corporate stock. Prior to the 1954 Code the courts could
state blithely that the distribution was essentially equivalent to a dividend
without considering whether the transaction was a cancellation of indebt-
edness or an assumption of the obligation to purchase. This lackadaisical
approach is no longer available. The courts are now faced with a decision
as to whether to draw a dichotomy between the transactions or to ration-
alize them on similar grounds by disregarding their form. The Internal
Revenue Service has indicated that the cancellation of indebtedness may
be viewed as an assumption of the shareholder's obligation.47 Thus, the
two situations are drawn under one theoretical umbrella. However,
query-is this rationalization proper in light of the express wording of
the statute?
B. Declaration of Dividends to the Seller-Are They Part
of the Purchase Price?
The question arises as to whether a dividend declared in connection
with a sale of stock, and paid to the seller because he is the holder of title
on the designated date, is a part of the purchase price received by the
seller or a distribution of a dividend. If it is a part of the purchase price,
46. In Television Indus., Inc., 32 T.C. 1297 (1959), aff'd, 284 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1960),
the shareholder owned 950 of the 1,000 outstanding shares at the time of the redemption of
260 of the corporate shares. The corporation cancelled a debt that had been incurred by
the shareholder to enable it to purchase the stock of the redeeming corporation. The court
held that the payment for the redemption by cancellation of the debt constituted a dividend
within the meaning of § 115(g). Under the 1954 Code this transaction would not fall
within one of the definitive subsections of § 302, and, therefore, the question would be
similar to the one presented under § 115(g), i.e., whether the distribution was essentially
equivalent to a dividend. Section 302(b) (1).
47. Rev. Rul. 57-353, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 223. Two shareholders contracted to buy
out a third. When they found that they could not make the payments on the contract they
had the corporation redeem stock from them and they used the funds to pay their obliga-
tions. There was a fourth shareholder and this made the redemption from the two dis-
proportionate. However, it was not disproportionate enough to meet the criteria of §
302(b)(2). The ruling found the redemption equivalent to a dividend and, thus, not with-
in § 302(b) (1). However, the Service stated:
While the transaction described is viewed as a redemption of stock from B and
C, it would, nevertheless, be a dividend to them if it were viewed instead as a
direct purchase by the corporation from A since the effect of such a purchase
would be the assumption of B's and C's liabilities to A by the corporation. Such
an assumption of the liabilities of stockholders is a distribution to them under
section 301 of the Code. Id. at 225.
Thus, this ruling assumes that the redemption transaction can be viewed as though it were
an assumption of the obligation of the shareholder.
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the seller will only have to pay a capital gains tax on any gain on the sale;
if the distribution is a dividend to him he will have to pay an ordinary
income tax for the total distribution to the extent of the earnings and
profits of the corporation.48 The buyer will have no income from the dis-
tribution if it is a dividend to the seller. 9 But if the distribution is a
part of the payment of the purchase price it may constitute a dividend to
him to the extent of earnings and profits.50
The principle seems to be that if the dividend reduces the amount
paid by the buyer on the total agreed-upon purchase price, then the
distribution is income to him, taxed at ordinary rates.5 ' Analogically, if
the distribution does not affect the agreed-upon purchase price then it
is income to the seller. 2
The difficulty lies in determining whether the dividend affects the
agreed-upon purchase price. Apparently, if there is a dividend declared
after an informal agreement as to the purchase price, which becomes
formalized subsequent to the dividend declaration, the dividend is con-
sidered a distribution to the seller. This is so even though the informally
agreed-upon purchase price is reduced by the amount of the dividend
to determine the final price.5" When the agreed-upon price is not altered
by a subsequent dividend declaration, the dividend is not considered as
affecting the purchase price. This result obtains even though the parties,
when contracting for the sale, took the dividend to be declared into ac-
count in determining the price.54
Although, generally, the seller would prefer to treat the dividend
as part of the purchase price, thereby subjecting himself to a capital
gains tax only on the amount of the gain, there is one situation in which
this is not the most desirable result. This situation would encompass a
transaction in which the shareholder is a corporation.55 In this instance,
if the distribution is a dividend to the seller, the shareholder-corporation
will be entitled to an eighty-five per cent dividends received deduction.56
48. Merrill C. Gilmore, 25 T.C. 1321 (1956). See §§ 301, 316.
49. Sam E. Wilson, Jr., 27 T.C. 976 (1957).
50. Mayer v. Donnelly, 247 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Fritiof T. Christensen, 33
T.C. 500 (1959); cf. Charles Dreifus Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Pa.
1956).
51. Ibid.
A steady line of decisions, however, culminating in the recent case of Northern
Trust Co. v. United States, [193 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1951)] seems to have estab-
lished that dividends on stock held in escrow, when used to reduce the purchase
price, will be considered income to the buyer. Redlich, The Sale of a Closely-
Held Corporate Business, 9 TAx L. Rxv. 354, 355 (1954). (Footnotes omitted.)
52. Merrill C. Gilmore, 25 T.C. 1321 (1956); Loyld H. Diehl, 1 T.C. 139 (1942),
aff'd, 142 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1944).
53. Sam E. Wilson, Jr., 27 T.C. 976 (1957).
54. See note 52 supra.
55. See Charles Dreifus Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Pa. 1956);
Lloyd H. Diehl, 1 T.C. 139 (1942), aff'd, 142 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1944).
56. Section 243.
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Thus, the total tax on the distribution, at most, would be approximately
seven and one-half per cent.
5 7
C. The Effect of a Redemption from the Selling Shareholder
The basic arrangement to be considered in this section is one in which
Grab and Gimmee sell their entire interest to Friendly.58 In the past the
Tax Court held that a sale by Grab and Gimmee of part of their stock
with a subsequent redemption of the remainder of their stock by the cor-
poration did not cause dividend consequences to the remaining share-
holder, Friendly, if he was not personally obligated to purchase.59
This result obtained even though Grab and Gimmee were paid in corporate
notes, payment to be made over a period of years. 0 It would seem, a
fortiori, if the payment were made immediately by the corporation out
of past accumulations there would be no dividend consequences to the
remaining shareholder.6
Of course, if Friendly agrees to buy the corporate stock and has it
redeemed after he has made the purchase, he will be subject to dividend
consequences, 2 unless the redemption is one not essentially equivalent
to a dividend or meets one of the specific criteria of section 302.63
57. Of course, if there would be no gain on the sale the seller would prefer the dis-
tribution to constitute payment of part of the purchase price, whether or not the seller
was a corporate body. If the distribution was a dividend there would be a tax liability to
the extent of the distributing corporation's earnings and profits. Whereas, if the distribution
was part of the purchase price there would be no gain and, thus, no income subject to tax.
58. See text following note 7 supra.
59. Ray Edenfield, 19 T.C. 13 (1952).
60. Ibid. In Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954), it was held that a
redemption of the remainder of the selling shareholder's stock was an "exchange" and,
therefore, he was only subject to a capital gains tax on the gain derived from the redemp-
tion. The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that it will follow Zenz in cases arising under
the 1939 Code, Rev. Rul. 54-458, 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 167, and also in those arising under
the 1954 Code, Rev. Rul. 55-745, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 223. There was no specific require-
ment under § 115(g) that there be a termination of interest for the redemption to qualify
for "exchange" treatment. However, the Service in Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 115-9, 4 Fed. Reg.
729 (1939), formulated the following as one test for non-dividend equivalence: "(A]
cancellation or redemption by a corporation of all the stock of a particular shareholder,
so that the shareholder ceases to be interested in the affairs of the corporation, does not
affect a distribution of a taxable dividend." (Emphasis added.) Under § 302(b)(3) of the
1954 Code, if there is a termination of the shareholder's interest this will automatically
qualify the redemption for "exchange" treatment. The court did not consider what might
constitute a termination of interest in Zenz. It merely concluded that if all the shares of
the particular shareholder were redeemed there was a termination of interest. However, in
Zenz the obligation of the purchasers to pay the price of the shares acquired from the
seller was secured by a pledge of the stock they acquired. May this negate a termination
of the seller's interest? If so, the seller could have dividend consequences upon a redemp-
tion of the remainder of his shares.
61. Cf. Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954). See text following note 120
infra.
62. Bell v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1957); Woodworth v. Commissioner,
218 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1955); Lowenthal v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1948);
Edgar S. Idol, 38 T.C. No. 47 (June 27, 1962); Frank P. Holloway, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1257 (1951), aff'd mem., 203 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1953). See II(A) of this article's text
supra.
63. See II(A)(2) of this article's text supra.
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If the transaction is arranged so that first the seller has part of his
stock redeemed by the corporation and thereafter sells the remainder of
his shares to the purchaser, the distribution to the seller will not be con-
sidered equivalent to a dividend 4 if: (1) a complete termination of the
seller's interest was contemplated from the beginning; and (2) the re-
demption was the first step in the plan. Attempting the transaction in
this fashion does leave the seller vulnerable. He might suffer dividend
consequences even though he intended a sale of his entire interest, if the
court refuses to consider the steps as integral to the total plan.65 The
wisest procedure for the seller would be to sell some of his shares first
and then have the corporation redeem the remainder. This would place
his side of the transaction clearly within the terms of the section entitling
him to treat the redemption as an exchange.
66
In a later decision the Tax Court held that when corporate earnings
produced after the taxpayer agreed to purchase were used to pay the pur-
chase price of stock redeemed from the seller, the payments constituted
constructive dividends to the remaining shareholder. 7 The court did not
declare the actual payments to be the dividends, but said rather that the
total transaction, when completed by a stock dividend of the redeemed
shares, constituted a dividend in the year the stock dividend was distrib-
uted. The decision was reversed on appeal.6 The rationale of the Tax
Court had been that the entire transaction was a sham and that, in effect,
the corporation purchased the shares for the remaining shareholders.
The court of appeals, however, reasoned that the stock dividend was not
a taxable transaction. This left the question open as to whether the actual
payments constituted dividends in the year in which they were made.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that if,
as a matter of fact, a corporation purchases stock, directly or indirectly,
64. Bains v. United States, 289 F.2d 644 (Ct. C1. 1961); cf. United States v. Carey,
289 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961).
65. See the opinion of the Tax Court in Irwin G. Lukens, 26 T.C. 900 (1956). This
was reversed in Lukens v. Commissioner, 246 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1957).
66. Section 302(b)(3). See note 60 supra.
67. Joseph P. Schmitt, 20 T.C. 352 (1953). The total earnings for the period during
which the stock was being redeemed exceeded the purchase price although for any given
year the earnings might not have been sufficient to cover the payment for the stock.
68. Schmitt v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1954). The facts were even stronger
in Schmitt than they were in Robert Deutsch, 38 T.C. 118 (1962), to support dividend con-
sequences to the remaining shareholders. In Schmitt there were two other minority share-
holders whom the taxpayers persuaded to sell their shares to the taxpayers while the cor-
poration was paying for the purchase of the shares being redeemed. This was to prevent
any questioning of the transaction by minority shareholders. In effect, corporate funds were
being used for the personal benefit of the taxpayers. See Note, Buying Out Insurgent Share-
holders With Corporate Funds, 70 YALE L.J. 308 (1960). Thus, in Schmitt it is clearly
shown that the taxpayers were using the corporate earnings for their personal benefit.
However, in Schmitt the government sought to tax a stock dividend made up of the
redeemed shares, rather than the actual redemption payments. The circuit court seized
this innocuous event as the essence of the case and held that there were no tax consequences
from the distribution of a pro rata stock dividend.
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from the seller for the remaining shareholders and they receive the
stock, the payment is a constructive distribution to the remaining share-
holders.6" The important factor is that the government attempts to
tax the distribution and not the transaction through which the re-
maining shareholders receive the stock. Thus, if the remaining share-
holders end up with the shares that were being sold, the fact that they
acquired the shares through a stock dividend would seem to be of little
significance so long as the government was attempting to focus on the
payment as the income producing event, rather than the dividend.
Recently, the Tax Court decided a case, apparently on an assumption
of obligation theory, but with more profound implications.7 The tax-
payer purchased a few shares of corporate stock from the sole share-
holder and agreed to purchase or cause the corporation to purchase the
remaining shares over a period of time. The contract provided that from
its inception, the purchaser would be in control of the corporation. He
could vote the stock and was entitled to receive all dividends as long as
he was not in default on the contract. The payments were made by the
corporation. They were held to be dividend distributions to the pur-
chaser.71 The court attempted to rationalize its holding on alternative
theories: (1) that the payments were made in discharge of an obligation
of the taxpayer; or (2) that the taxpayer owned the stock at the time
the payments were made and therefore his stock was being redeemed and
not the stock of the seller. Under this construction, the taxpayer, in
effect, owned one hundred per cent of the stock both before and after the
redemption and therefore the redemption was essentially equivalent to a
dividend.7 2
The first theory clearly appears to be in conflict with prior inter-
pretations of agreements of this type both by the Tax Court73 and the
Internal Revenue Service.74 It has been held that when the taxpayer has
69. Louis H. Zipp, 28 T.C. 314 (1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 934 (1959).
If the stock is in reality purchased by a remaining shareholder and paid for by
the corporation, then, regardless of the form of this transaction, the payment
will be considered a dividend to the shareholders who make the purchase. Rev.
Rul. 58-614, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 920.
But see Earle F. Tucker, 23 T.C. 115 (1954), rev'd, 226 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1955).
70. Robert Deutsch, 38 T.C. 118 (1962).
71. Since some payments were made before the 1954 Code went into effect and some
were made after the effective date, the distributions were held to be dividends under both
§ 115(a) of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, as amended, ch. 144, § 2, 61 Stat. 179 (1947), as
amended, and § 316(a) of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954.
72. This result would obtain under either § 115(g) or § 302(a). See Nolan, The
Uncertain Tax Treatment of Stock Redemptions: A Legislative Proposal, 65 HARV. L. REV.
255 (1951).
73. Lloyd H. Diehl, 1 T.C. 139 (1942).
74. Rev. Rul. 59-286, 1959-2 Cume. BULL. 103. See generally II(A) (1) (c) of this article's
text supra. See also Joseph R. Holsey, 28 T.C. 962 (1957), rev'd, 258 F.2d 865 (3d Cir.
1958).
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the alternative of purchasing or causing the corporation to purchase the
stock, a purchase by the corporation is not in fulfillment of the taxpayer's
obligation. 75 The second ground for the decision seems more plausible.
However, the proper focal point of the decision, it is suggested, should
be the fact that the purchaser was paying for his acquisition from accu-
mulations the corporation would earn after he had entered into the agree-
ment.76 In effect, he was using the business entity he had acquired to earn
funds to pay for the purchase.
D. Redemption from One of the Present Shareholders to Transfer
Ownership to the Remaining Shareholders
In this transaction Grab decides to purchase Gimmee's shares. He
can accomplish this by having the corporation redeem Gimmee's entire
interest. Grab exercises particular care to avoid any personal obligation
to purchase these shares. If the redemption is from past accumulated
earnings, whether more77 or less78 than book value79 is paid for the
shares, there are no resultant dividend consequences to the remaining
shareholder."0 If the redemption is in kind, a similar result will obtain."'
Further, a redemption from earnings to be acquired after the trans-
action will not produce dividend consequences to the remaining share-
holder.8 2 Tucker v. Commissioner8 carried this view to the furthest
extreme. The taxpayer sought to acquire shares of the corporation
75. S. K. Ames, Inc., 46 B.T.A. 1020 (1942)
76. See text following note 120 infra.
77. Fred F. Fischer, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 520 (1947).
78. Joseph R. Holsey, 28 T.C. 962 (1957), rev'd, 258 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1958), acq.,
Rev. Rul. 58-614, 1958-2 Cum. BuLL. 920.
79. This is assuming that fair market value and book value are approximately the
same. This appears to be reasonable for a close corporation that has no active market for
its shares.
80. Niederkrome v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1959), on remand, 19 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 459 (1960); Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1958); Hargleroad
v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 92 (D. Neb. 1962); Ward v. Roundtree, 193 F. Supp. 154
(M.D. Tenn. 1961); Summerfield v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Mich. 1956),
aff'd per curiam, 249 F.2d 446 (6th Cir. 1957).
[T]here is no authority affirmatively supporting the proposition that a redemption
of one stockholder's shares, at fair market value, constitutes a dividend to the
remaining shareholder. Rev. Rul. 59-286, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 103, 105.
81. Stout v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1959).
82. Earle F. Tucker, 23 T.C. 115 (1954), rev'd, 226 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1955). The
Tax Court recently implied this conclusion in Milton F. Priester, 38 T.C. No. 36 (May 29,
1962). In that case the agreement was entered into in 1953. However, substantial payments
were not to be made until 1957, 1958 and 1959. This apparently was to give the corporation
sufficient time to earn enough funds for the taxpayer to have available for payments on
the purchase agreement. The court held that a redemption from a third party who had
purchased the shares in place of the taxpayer did not produce a constructive dividend to the
taxpayer. The court made this. finding after it first had decided that the corporation had
not paid the taxpayer's obligation. See text accompanying note 27 supra. Cf. Ruphane B.
Iverson, 29 B.T.A. 863 (1934) (dividend consequences based on corporation paying share-
holder's obligation).
83. 226 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1955).
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owned by a third party. As part of the consideration for the acquisition,
the corporation agreed to pay twenty per cent of its earnings for the
next five years. The formality of a redemption was not observed.84 The
stock was transferred directly to the taxpayer. The court held:
We think that to treat the payments made by the Company
to ... [the third party] during the years in suit, as income
constructively received by .. . [the taxpayer] was carrying
the doctrine of constructive dividends too far.8"
E. Redemption by the Corporation for the Purpose of Immediate
Resale
A method of shifting control or making stock available for purchase
when the purchaser does not have funds presently available, is a corpo-
rate redemption in contemplation of a resale. Generally, this method has
been held not to give rise to dividend consequences under either section
115(g) of the 1939 Code or section 302 of the 1954 Code, even though
the redemption is pro rata." Thus, if three stockholders wish to provide
stock for their employees they may have the corporation redeem some
of their stock pro rata to keep available for purchase by the employees.
The redemption will not be considered essentially equivalent to a divi-
dend. Apparently, this is the counter part of the "conduit theory."8"
In this situation it is the corporation that is the conduit. The courts
seem to consider the transaction as a sale of the stock to the employees
or third parties rather than a redemption. 8
Admittedly, in these transactions the sale can be made directly
between the buyer and seller without the intervention of the corporation.
However, when the shares redeemed are immediately resold the re-
demption is innocuous. The difficulty arises when there is no immediate
resale or there is only a resale of part of the redeemed shares. In these
situations the shareholder has obtained corporate funds at capital gains
rates while still maintaining his percentage interest in the corporation,
or, at least, the change in his interest is not sufficiently disproportionate
for the distribution to be other than a dividend. 9 The rationale offered
84. The taxpayer was not the only remaining shareholder. However, the corporation
could have redeemed the shares and distributed them in a non-pro rata stock dividend to
the taxpayer. The other shareholder wanted the taxpayer to acquire the shares and, therefore,
he would have consented to this.
85. Tucker v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 177, 179 (8th Cir. 1955). This reasoning dearly
shows that the only things being carried too far are the anomalous results in situations
of this type. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
86. Smith v. United States, 131 Ct. Cl. 748, 130 F. Supp. 586 (1955) ; John A. Decker,
32 T.C. 326 (1959), aff'd per curiam, 286 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1960). See also H. F. Asmussen,
36 B.T.A. 878 (1937); George Youell, 18 B.T.A. 599 (1929).
87. See II(A) () (a) of this article's text supra.
88. Smith v. United States, 131 Ct. Cl. 748, 130 F. Supp. 586 (1955); George Youell,
18 B.T.A. 599 (1929).
89. Smith v. United States, 131 Ct. Cl. 748, 130 F. Supp. 586 (1955); John A. Decker,
32 T.C. 326 (1959), af'd per curiam, 286 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1960).
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in support of treating the transaction as an exchange is that the redeemed
stock is more akin to an asset when there is a contemplated resale. There-
fore, the transaction is more like a purchase than a dividend distribu-
tion. 90
III. A PROPOSED CHANGE IN THE LAW
A. How Is It To Be Accomplished?
A proposed change in the law will be suggested in this section. It
is set forth as a modification through legislation. However, the reason
for the method suggested is that the courts have shown a reluctance to
change prior formulations. The use of this technique should not be taken
as an indication that the changes cannot be made with all propriety by
judicial decision. In fact, this would seem to be the preferable method.
The statutory proposal is not intended to be completely definitive.
Rather, it is the framework for a new section. Its wording indicates lee-
way for the courts in interpreting its applicability.9' This suggests that
if the judiciary should refuse to take the horse by the bit in the first in-
stance, the legislation will not necessarily make its job easier. Also,
certain rigid lines have been drawn. 2 To alleviate an inappropriate ap-
plication of this rigidity, exceptions and presumptions had to be made,
thereby creating some uncertainty. 8 This approach indicates that deci-
sion on a case-by-case basis is not outweighed by the need for certainty.
It is hoped that the following discussion of the legislation and its appli-
cation will show by force of reason that the changes suggested readily
fit into the present statutory framework and that they can be reasonably
adopted by the decisional process. 4
B. The Proposal
Sec. 316x. Except as provided in subparagraph two (2):
(1) When a corporation redeems shares of its corporate
stock,
(a) in the context of a purchase of the corporation
by the remaining shareholders, and
(b) payment for the redeemed stock is made by the
90. From the standpoint of the company, by adjusting its book entries this could
be made to appear the same as the distribution of a dividend. This would require
reducing the accumulated earnings and undivided profits by the amounts paid out
for the stock and not entering the treasury stock as an asset. However, this would
be somewhat unrealistic in view of the fact that the company has since realized
over $75,000 from the sale of this stock to key employees. John A. Decker, 32 T.C.
326, 332 (1959).
91. Section 316x(1)(a). [References to §§ 316x & 301x are to the proposed legislation
found in III(B) of this article's text infra.]
92. Section 316x(2).
93. Ibid.
94. See HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBL. MS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION Or LAW 665-67 (tent. ed. 1958).
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corporation in the taxable year or years suc-
ceeding the year of purchase,
(i) out of earnings and profits accumulated
subsequent to the year of purchase,
(c) the payment for the redeemed stock shall consti-
tute a "dividend" to the remaining shareholders
in the year in which the payment is made.
(i) Remaining shareholders include not only
those who were shareholders prior to the
redemption, but any shareholder who owns
stock in the corporation immediately after
the redemption has occurred.
(ii) Under paragraph (b) of this subparagraph
payment will be considered as being made in
accordance with this subparagraph if the
corporation borrows money or property with
which it pays for the redemption and repays
the loan out of earnings and profits accumu-
lated in taxable years succeeding the year of
redemption.
(2) If there are more than ten (10) remaining share-
holders after the redemption then subparagraph one
(1) is not applicable, unless the government can sus-
tain the burden of proof that each shareholder con-
sented to the redemption for the purpose of purchas-
ing the corporation.
(3) If subparagraph one (1) of this subsection is appli-
cable to a transaction, then the basis of the shares of
stock owned by the remaining shareholders shall be
increased, pro rata, by the amount of the distribution
taxable to them as a dividend under subparagraph
one (1).
(4) Whenever a redemption is found to be within this sub-
section then section 302 shall not be applicable to the
redemption and the effect on the redemptionee shall be
as though he sold his stock to the remaining share-
holders.
Sec. 301x.
(1) When a corporation redeems its corporate stock,
(a) in the context of a purchase of the corporation by
the remaining shareholders,
(2) the payment for the redeemed stock shall constitute a
distribution of property to the remaining shareholders
within section 301 (a) in the year or years in which
the payment or payments are made.
At the outset it should be noted that the proposed changes are set
within sections 316 and 301 of the 1954 Code. In the past, in attempting
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to find constructive dividends to remaining shareholders after a redemp-
tion from selling shareholders, the courts had applied the redemption sec-
tion of the 1939 Code.95 This was an inappropriate use of that section. 6
The basic purpose of the section was to provide dividend treatment for
a shareholder whose stock was redeemed when the distribution he
received was tantamount to a dividend. 7 The section was not intended
to be used as a weapon against a shareholder whose stock was not re-
deemed. In order to find a constructive dividend under the 1939 Code,
therefore, the general dividend section should have been the one ap-
plied. 8 This error has been remedied in some cases under the 1954
Code, as the courts have considered the general dividend sections99
appropriate in determining whether the remaining shareholders have
received constructive dividends upon the redemption of the selling
shareholder's stock.
100
It has been argued that if the redemption comes within the literal
wording of section 302, it cannot also be considered a dividend to the
remaining shareholders. If it is in exchange for the retirement of stock,
it cannot also be in payment for the purchase. 101 However, this over-
looks the fact that the arrangement is in reality, a purchase by the
corporation for the buyer cast in the form of a redemption. Merely
because the arrangement literally fits within the redemption section
should not becloud the effect of the transaction.
The basic premise underlying the proposed change is that there
should be dividend consequences to a purchaser of a close corporate
entity when the corporation is used to produce the income that pays for
the purchase. In a close corporation there are no independent controls
on the use of the corporation by the shareholders for their personal
benefit. 2 Thus, the use of the corporation as a separate taxable entity
95. Section 115(g). See, e.g., Joseph R. Holsey, 28 T.C. 962 (1957), rev'd, 258 F.2d
865 (3d Cir. 1958).
96. Note, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1387 (1954).
97. H.R. REP. No. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1925).
98. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 115(a), as amended, ch. 144, § 2, 61 Stat. 179 (1949),
as amended.
99. Sections 301, 316.
100. Robert Deutsch, 38 T.C. 118 (1962).
101. Note, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1387, 1388 (1954).
102. If there is more than one shareholder, this assumes that the others are in accord
with the proposed transaction. This common accord is more readily obtainable in a
situation in which there are only a few parties. In a large corporation in which there are
:many stockholders, total consent to a plan that will not directly benefit all the stock-
holders is difficult to obtain. Therefore, with these corporations the independent control
is the probability of a minority shareholder's suit if the directors of the corporation cause it
to repurchase its stock without a proper business reason. Compare Anderson v. Albert &
J. M. Anderson Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 343, 90 N.E.2d 541 (1950), and Bennett v. Propp,
187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962), with Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136 (Del. Ch. 1960).
Directors cannot take advantage of their official position to manipulate the issue
and purchase of shares of the stock of the corporation in order to secure for
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is subjected all the more readily to abuse. It is conceded that if a cor-
poration increases its wealth through productivity, this alone is not suffi-
cient to create taxable income to the shareholders under the present
statutory scheme. 0 But the situation is different when corporate funds
are used to purchase treasury stock so that the remaining shareholder
or shareholders obtain complete ownership of the corporation. 10 4 The
reason generally espoused by the courts as to why there are no dividend
consequences to the remaining shareholder is that there is no realizable
event.'05 However, this clearly overlooks the fact that there was a
corporate distribution. This is the necessary event for a dividend, as-
suming there are sufficient earnings and profits.
The question that remains is why this distribution should be attri-
buted to the remaining shareholder. Certainly, it will not be contended
that merely because it was not received by the remaining shareholder,
it cannot be considered as income to him.'00 If Grab owned an apart-
ment house on which he borrowed extensively, the mere fact that the
tenants paid their monthly rent to the mortgagee would not alter the fact
that Grab had to include this rent as part of his income.0° Now the fol-
lowing cry will be heard: "But in the situation being considered there is
no ownership of the corporate entity as such; it is a distinct person for
tax purposes. When it receives income it pays tax on that income.0 8
Therefore, when it enters into a contract to purchase its own stock, even
themselves the control of the corporation and then to place the ownership of the
stock in such a position as will perpetuate that control. Such action constitutes
a breach of their fiduciary obligations to the corporation and a wilful disregard
of the rights of other stockholders. Anderson v. Albert & J. M. Anderson Mfg. Co.,
supra at 346-47, 90 N.E.2d at 544.
See generally Note, Buying Out Insurgent Shareholders with Corporate Funds, 70 YALE L.J.
308 (1960); 6A FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 2845-61 (1950).
It may be contended that the creditors in a close corporation may prevent corporate
action solely for the benefit of a shareholder. However, in a redemption transaction there
seems to be very little a creditor can do if there is sufficient surplus from which the re-
demption is to be made. "[Cireditors are not injured where the corporation has assets
largely in excess of its indebtedness at the time of the purchase; and insolvency of the
corporation at some later time is immaterial." 6A FLETCHER, op. cit. supra § 2854, at
402-03.
103. Consider the ratio decidendi of Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 865 (3d Cir.
1958).
104. See, e.g., Sneed, A Defense of the Tax Court's Result in Prunier and Casale, 43
CORNELL L.Q. 339, 352 (1958):
[A] mere enhancement in the value of shares owned by a shareholder because of
corporate business profits should not be taxed to the shareholder because this
eliminates a distinction, albeit perhaps not a wise one, deeply rooted in the Code
itself. On the other hand, the corporate structure should not be used to shield
from the income tax the shareholder who derives benefits, distinct from those
normally flowing to a shareholder because of the success of the trade or business
of the corporation, through accumulation and investment of the corporate earnings.
105. See, e.g., Schmitt v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1954).
106. See, e.g., Illinois Agricultural Holding Co., 46 B.T.A. 1, aff'd, 131 F.2d 583 (7th
Cir. 1942) (dictum).
107.'See, e.g., 1 CCH 1963 STAND. FEn. TAx-REP. U 202.02.
108. Section 11; but see § 1372.
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though it is for the purpose of giving the remaining shareholders com-
plete ownership, there is no distribution to these shareholders. This entity,
independent of the shareholder for tax purposes, merely made a pur-
chase."
It is conceded that the corporation is a separate entity and that
every activity in which it engages which is beneficial to the shareholders
does not give rise to a distribution to them. 9 If the corporation buys
a machine, its payments on the machine do not constitute income to
the shareholders. Even if there be only one shareholder it is not income
to him. Why then in this case when the corporation purchases its own
stock should the payments constitute income to the shareholders? The
answer is relatively simple. Because a close corporation and its share-
holders when acting in concert to acquire the ownership of the corporate
entity for the remaining shareholders should be considered one for tax
purposes.
In the first place, in this type transaction no meaningful distinction
can be drawn between corporate and shareholder motive."0 Of course,
the following type argument may be made: the corporation, in order
to maintain its franchise, has to get rid of shareholder X.1" Therefore,
it redeems his stock and complete control is vested in shareholder Y.
Thus, the motivation for the redemption came at the corporate level.
But is this argument sound? After the transaction shareholder Y is the
only individual left with an equity interest in the corporation. If the
corporation, loses its franchise, he as well as the corporation will suffer.
Instead of having the corporation redeem the stock he could have pur-
chased it himself. If he had no funds he could have borrowed them from
the corporation, or from an independent source if that were possible.
But instead he chose to allow the corporation to redeem. What difference
could it make to him? There were no other shareholders to contest the
use of the corporate funds. The act of redemption was innocuous.
Whether the corporation obtained the shares as treasury stock or he
obtained them, the result would be the same. He would have complete
ownership. Thus, rationally, it is impossible to separate corporate and
shareholder purpose in this situation.
Secondly, what is the corporation acquiring when it purchases its
109. See the taxpayer's argument in Holsey set forth in Graham, Redemption Problems-
The Holsey and Zipp Cases, 36 TAXES 925, 930 (1958).
110. See Sneed, A Defense of the Tax Court's Result in Prunier and Casale, 43 CORNELL
L.Q. 339, 370 (1958):
Nowhere is the deceptive nature of the "benefit" analysis better revealed than in
this case [Tucker, Note 111, inra. Expenditures which directly serve the investment
interest always further, to some extent, the group's ability to carry on the business
for which they joined together. In that sense they always provide a benefit to the
corporation, but the immediate and primary objective is to affect the investment
the shareholder has in the business. To repeat, this cannot be fully grasped so
long as "the weighing of benefits" occupies the court's attention.
111. Cf. Tucker v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1955).
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own stock? In a close corporation where there is no ready market for
the corporate shares, the stock certainly cannot be considered an
asset." 2 In addition, in a situation in which the remaining shareholders
cause the redemption so as to acquire the corporation, they would have
no intention of permitting the corporation to subsequently resell the
acquired stock." 8 Therefore, in this situation treasury stock has very
little in common with an asset. At best, the corporation is making pay-
ments and receiving nothing in return to advance corporate and share-
holder motives which are indistinguishable. Further, there usually is
no corporate motive for the redemption. In this situation you have the
corporation paying a consideration and receiving nothing in return." 4
Thus, it is proper to consider the corporation and the shareholder as
one in these instances. In effect, the payments are being earned by a
producing entity, like any other investment, and going directly to a
third party for the benefit of the shareholders. Therefore, the payments
should be included in the shareholders' income." 5
It has been suggested by some writers that to tax the distributions
to the remaining shareholders would subvert the redemption sections
of the Code."' Their argument appears to be that by creating dividend
consequences for the buyer upon a redemption by the seller, there will
not be as much incentive to use the redemption provisions. However,
the only transactions in which there would be dividend treatment are
those in which there is a contemplated purchase of a close corporation.
Further, the argument overlooks a basic fact: the redemption sections
were not passed originally to alleviate the tax burden, but to add to it
by providing ordinary income consequences when a redemption is
112. See ACCOUNTANT'S HANDBOOK § 21.32-33 (4th ed. Wixon 1956). "The vast majority
of accounting authorities do not recognize any logical basis for showing treasury shares as an
asset." But see II(E) of this article's text supra.
113. Compare John A. Decker, 32 T.C. 326 (1959), aff'd per curiam, 286 F.2d 427 (6th
Cir. 1960).
114. See, e.g., Robert Deutsch, 38 T.C. 118 (1962) ; Television Indus., Inc., 32 T.C. 1297
(1959), aff'd, 284 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1960); Joseph P. Schmitt, 20 T.C. 352 (1953), rev'd,
208 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1954); Ray Edenfield, 19 T.C. 13 (1952).
115. Professor Sneed has offered a rationale similar to this one although he does not
consider it necessary to pierce the corporate veil. His basic position is:
A shareholder should be considered as having realized accumulated earnings and
profits of the corporation in the form of dividends when such gains in an ascertain-
able amount are primarily devoted to purposes which serve interests of the share-
holder distinct from his interest as a proprietor of the business conducted by the
corporation. Sneed, A Defense of the Tax Court's Result in Prunier and Casale, 43
CoRNELL L.Q. 339, 353 (1958) (Italics omitted.).
He then divides the interests of the shareholder into three categories: (1) his interest in the
business activity of the corporation; (2) his interest in the investment represented by the
stock; and (3) his personal interests. If the expenditure was for either interest (2) or (3),
the distribution should be taxable to the shareholder.
116. Smith, Recent Developments in the Field of Corporate Business Purchase Agree-
ments, 14 TAX L. REv. 413 (1959); Graham, Redemption Problems-The Holsey and Zipp
Cases, 36 TAXES 925 (1958).
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equivalent to a dividend." 7 The provisions in the 1954 Code made it
more certain, to an extent, when a redemption is to receive exchange
treatment." 8 But basically, the sections have been and still are pre-
ventive.
Also, the redemption sections are concerned with the seller's side
of the transaction. The seller will have a sale or exchange whether the
transaction is cast as a redemption not equivalent to a dividend or as
a purchase by the remaining shareholders." 9 Therefore, as far as the
seller is concerned, treating the redemption as a distribution to the re-
maining shareholders will not affect his tax incidents. Finally, the argu-
Inent fails to consider that by releasing these conjured frustrations of
section 302, the court is permitting a more ruinous result, i.e., it is over-
riding the basic scheme of corporate distributions by permitting this
distribution of corporate funds to be tax free to the remaining share-
holders.
The proposed section seeks to tax as a dividend only those pay-
ments made for the redemption of the seller's stock out of earnings ac-
cumulated subsequent to the date of purchase. 20 The section as worded
establishes the date of purchase as the last day of the taxable year in
which the transaction took place by creating dividend consequences
only for those payments made in the succeeding taxable years.' 2' This.
is not to imply that it would be unreasonable to assume that the parties
may agree upon the transfer of control in January and use the earnings
of that taxable year to pay for the redemption. 2 2 Rather, it is to avoid
the difficulties inherent in a factual determination of when the purchase
actually occurred. This problem is particularly acute in those situations
in which the transactions are accomplished informally. Thus, all pay-
rents that are to be made in taxable years succeeding the year of thei
transaction are susceptible to dividend treatment.
117. Section 115(g) was itself couched in terms providing that it was to create dividend
consequences in certain situations, not absolve one from this type treatment:
If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock . . . at such time and in such manner
as to make the distribution and cancellation or redemption in whole or in part
essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount so
distributed . . . shall be treated as a dividend.
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1942):
It is believed that the proper application of section 115(g) will prove adequate to
prevent taxable dividends disguised as liquidations from receiving capital-gain
treatment.
118. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A73 (1954):
In lieu of a factual inquiry in every case it [§ 302] is intended to prescribe specific
conditions from which the taxpayer may ascertain whether a given redemption will
be taxable at rates applicable to the sale of assets or as a distribution of property
not in redemption of stock subject to section 301.
119. See §§ 302(a), 1222.
120. Section 316x(1) (b) (i).
121. Section 316x(1)(b).
122. Cf. Television Indus., Inc., 32 T.C. 1297 (1959), aff'd, 284 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1960).
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Further, it is also provided that if the corporation borrows money
to pay for the redemption immediately, but is to repay the loan from
funds earned subsequent to the year of purchase, these payments on
the loan will also give rise to possible dividend treatment. 25 Other-
wise, the effect of the proposal easily could be avoided by having the
corporation borrow the necessary funds for the redemption and pay for
the redeemed stock in the year of the purchase. In both cases: (1) when
the corporation agrees to pay for the stock over a period of years; or
(2) when the corporation borrows funds to pay for the redeemed stock
immediately with repayments on the loan to be made in future years,
the same result is achieved. The corporation is paying for the purchase
from funds earned subsequent to the purchase. The mere fact that the
form is different should not affect the result. The cases are not logically
distinguishable. If one type of transaction gives rise to dividend con-
sequences, so should the other.
Two fundamental criticisms have been levelled at this approach
of finding dividend consequences to the buyer only when payments are
made from future earnings. It has been suggested that there is no real
difference with reference to the remaining shareholder, whether future
earnings are used to pay for the redemption or payment is made out
of past accumulations and future earnings used to rebuild the net worth
to its pre-redemption level.124 Thus, why tax one and not the other
distribution to the remaining shareholder?
There is a basic distinction between the two situations. Consider
the first alternative presented in the Grab-Gimmee transaction. 2 5 By
having the corporation redeem Gimmee's stock for cash, Grab would
be acquiring a corporation with a value of 50,000 dollars. That was what
his interest was worth prior to the redemption. Thus, in effect, he ac-
quired no more than he had. Or consider the case in which Grab and
Gimmee decide to sell to Friendly. 2 ' Assume that the corporation was
entirely liquid and that Grab and Gimmee were paid 95,000 dollars
in cash immediately. Friendly would have acquired a corporation for
5,000 dollars. However, that is all the corporation would have been
worth. The payment for the redemption should not give rise to dividend
income to the buyer, even though future earnings are used to rebuild the
corporation back to its former position. The situation is simply that
Friendly bought or acquired an asset for which he paid full value; the
asset subsequently earned income and that income has not been distrib-
uted. Because the asset is a corporation the buyer does not have to
recognize the income until it is distributed to him. But when the corpo-
123. Section 316x(I) (c) (ii).
124. Redlich, The Sale oj a Closely-Held Corporate Business, 9 TAX L. REV. 354, 359
n.21 (1954).
125. See I(A) of this article's text supra.
126. Ibid.
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ration redeems Gimmee's stock by giving him notes for 50,000 dollars
payable annually, the situation is different.'27 Grab begins by owning
an enterprise worth 100,000 dollars, not 50,000 dollars. He has the
complete benefit of an enterprise double the size of the one he would
have had if the corporation had paid for the redemption immediately.
Thus, he is acquiring a corporate entity of 100,000 dollars with the use
of his interest, which is worth only 50,000 dollars. The future earnings
of the corporation are used to pay for his purchase. He started with an
enterprise owning producing assets double the value of his interest,
having paid nothing for the additional value.
Similarly, consider the sale to Friendly. 28 He could pay 5,000
dollars for five shares of stock and have the corporation redeem the
remainder by paying Grab and Gimmee over a period of years. Friendly
would have acquired a 100,000 dollar corporation for 5,000 dollars. He
would have the full investment value of the entity for a minimal price.
'This entity would then pay for the purchase out of its earnings. Thus,
the situation in which the redemption is financed from past accumula-
tions is quite different from the buyer's point of view from the purchase
made out of future earnings.
Consider also, that in the transactions in which the redemption is
made from past accumulations, the buyer is starting with a smaller in-
vestment. That is, he only has the earning capacity of a 50,000 dollar
or 5,000 dollar enterprise. He paid the value of this entity when he
made the purchase, or in Grab's case he owned that much of the invest-
ment originally. However, when the redemption is from future earnings
the buyer has a 100,000 dollar enterprise for which he has only paid
5,000 dollars; or in Grab's case he had a prior investment of 50,000
dollars. From the buyer's view the distinction is substantial between re-
demptions made out of past as contrasted with future earnings.
Secondly, it has been suggested that payment out of future earn-
ings "is nothing more than the typical case of one shareholder starting
out on a shoestring, investing relatively small amounts of capital, and
having the corporation issue large amounts of bonds to others which
are later redeemed as the corporation earns money."' 29 The payment on
these bonds apparently would not give rise to a taxable event.180 Thus,
why should payment for the redeemed stock be anything different than
payment of other corporate indebtedness when a shareholder starts a
corporation on "a shoestring"?
There is a difference and it is very real. When a corporation is
begun on a shoestring it borrows money to acquire assets. This is some-
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
129. Note, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1387, 1389 (1954). (Footnotes omitted.)
130. This is assuming that there are no problems concerning "thin incorporations."
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thing of value to the corporation independent of any value it may have
to the shareholders. The payments on the loans are, therefore, in es-
sence, payments for the purchase of assets. However, when the corpora-
tion borrows to redeem stock, what is it acquiring? The stock is not an
asset. It has no real value to the corporation.' Of course, the selling
shareholder could effect a redemption in kind and then have the corpo-
ration repurchase the assets. However, this would not change the nature
of the transaction. In effect, it would be nothing more than a sham.
The corporation would be paying for something it had previously owned.
There would be no valid reason for the distribution and the immediate
repurchase. The corporation would not be acquiring an asset. In sub-
stance, it would be acquiring its own stock. Therefore, there is a sub-
stantial difference between a transaction in which there is borrowing
to finance a corporation begun on "a shoestring" and borrowing to
redeem a seller's stock in the context of a purchase of the corporation.
This distinction affords the basis for the difference in treatment between
the transactions.
The proposed section is limited to those situations in which the
redemption is made to effectuate a purchase of the corporation. 2 This
approach limits the applicability of the proposal and leaves uninhibited
other redemptions falling within the confines of section 302. As written,
the section requires the transaction to be "in the context of a purchase of
the corporation." This provision is aimed at those transactions in which
the seller's interest is completely terminated.33 The seller would there-
fore be entitled to exchange treatment under section 302 (b) (3), unless
the attribution rules were applicable. 3 4 For example: if a father and son
owned a corporation and the father wished to sell his interest in the
corporation to the son, a redemption of the father's stock, payment to
be made out of future earnings, might give rise to dividend consequences
to the father as a redemption essentially equivalent to a dividend." 5 In
addition, the proposed section 316x would also be applicable. This would
create the anomaly of having one distribution create double dividend
consequences. To avoid this result, section 316x(5) was added. Thus, if
the transaction is viewed as a sale, the son would have dividend income
and the father would have a capital gain on the sale.
The section is not intended to encompass those transactions in
-which a redemption is used to effect a shift in control or a partial sale
131. See note 112 supra and accompanying text.
132. Section 316x(1)(a).
133. Of course, to avoid application of the section, the parties could agree that the
seller retain a nominal amount of stock. It is hoped that the courts would look through this
agreement and find the section applicable. Whether there has been a complete termination
of interest should depend on the facts and not on perfunctory criteria.
134. Section 318(a).
135. This is assuming that the requisites of § 302(c)(2) are not met.
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of the seller's interest. These transactions do not contemplate a purchase
by the remaining shareholders as the seller still has an interest in the
corporation. 18 6 The remaining shareholders have not acquired the entire
corporation. Presumably the corporate entity will not be abused for the
benefit of the remaining shareholders when the seller retains an interest
in the corporate affairs. Therefore, there is no pressing reason to pierce
the corporate veil in this instance.
The proposed section is limited to close corporations. 37 The statute
defines a close corporation as one consisting of not more than ten share-
holders. This numerical figure was based on pragmatic grounds after
a consideration of the majority of cases in this area. The number of
.shareholders, rather than assets or earning power, was made a deter-
minative criterion because the crux of the problem is the abusive tactics
of a small number of shareholders. The important facet of the transac-
tion is the agreement of the shareholders to use the corporation as the
vehicle of purchase. Thus, the number of shareholders becomes im-
portant. However, the number is not limited in all instances to ten. The
section creates a presumption that it is not applicable if there are more
than ten shareholders. But if the government can prove in any given
case, in which the number of shareholders is in excess of ten, that all
the shareholders consented to purchase the corporation from the seller
by a redemption from future earnings, then the section will be appli-
cable. This is to prevent an easy avoidance of the section by using any
number of shareholders in excess of ten to make the purchase.
The purpose of the shareholder limitation is to avoid the problem
of presumptive dividend consequences'8" to the remaining shareholders
of a corporation which has a large number of shareholders (e.g., one
thousand), and which redeems the stock of one shareholder out of future
earnings."39 It has been suggested that there is no rational basis for
limiting the dividend treatment to shareholders of close corporations. 40
This distinction, it is submitted, is not only rational but proper. As was
suggested before, it is only in close corporations that complete agreement
among the remaining shareholders can readily be achieved. Thus, there
is no substantial control on the use of the corporation to make the pur-
chase. However, with a larger corporation, in which complete agreement
is difficult if not impossible to obtain, the directors will be subject to the
scrutiny of minority shareholders. They will not be willing to use, in-
discriminately, corporate funds solely for the benefit of a majority which
136. But see note 133 supra.
137. Section 316x(2).
138. The consequences are only presumptive, because it still has to be shown that the
redemption was in the context of a purchase. Section 316x(1) (a).
139. Consider the difficulties envisioned by Singer, Tax Consequences of Stock Redemp-
tions for Shareholders Whose Stock Is Not Redeemed, 38 ORE. L. REV. 1 (1958).
140. Redlich, The Sale of a Closely-Held Corporate Business, 9 TAX L. REV. 354, 358-59
(1954).
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desires the purchase.' 4 1 Thus, it is the small corporation that should be
pierced in the purchase-by-redemption situations as it is the one most
susceptible to abuse.
If the transaction falls within section 316x, the buyer will not have
dividend income attributed to him until the year that the payments are
made.1'4  This result obtains whether or not the corporation gives the
seller notes in exchange for his stock. If the notes have a fair market
value this result might appear to be contrary to general dividend con-
cepts.148 The view has been expressed that if the notes are considered
as given on behalf of the buyer, he should have to recognize income in
the year they are given. 44 However, the proposed section is concerned
with the buyer's side of the transaction. From his (reconstructed) point
of view he is receiving a distribution which he then uses to pay for the
stock. Even though the notes have been given by the corporation they
are more akin to notes of the buyer or remaining shareholder. It is not
until the corporation as an entity makes a payment that it is doing some-
thing that should create dividend consequences for the buyer. The im-
portant event is not the giving of the notes, but the corporation earning
income subsequent to the sale-income, the use of which is employed to
effect the purchase. Only when the income has been earned and payment
made is there a distribution of future earnings. If the corporation earns
no income and must make a payment on the notes out of past accumula-
tions, from the buyer's point of view this is a payment from capital and
he has received no income. This underlies the concept that dividends
to the remaining shareholders should be recognized only when payments
are made from future earnings. Thus, even though notes have been
given by the corporation, the remaining shareholder may not have to
recognize income if there are no subsequent earnings. The giving of the
notes is of no importance to the buyer within the concept of the proposal
and, therefore, it is not the taxable event.
Upon the receipt of a dividend under the proposed section, the re-
maining shareholder adds the amount of the dividend to the basis of the
stock he owns in the corporation. 45 This is in harmony with the rationale
of the proposal. Although he has not received additional shares in form,
the remaining shareholder has paid for the seller's interest when he has
the payment for the redemption from future earnings attributed to him.
141. See note 102 supra.
142. Section 316x(1) (c).
143. If notes are given and they have a fair market value, their value is dividend income
in the year they are received rather than in the year they are paid. See generally 2 P-H
1963 FED. TAx SERV. [ 9178, and particularly 2 P-H 1963 FED. TAx SERV. 9179-B.
144. Note, 67 HARV. L. R-v. 1387, 1392 (1954).
145. Section 316x(3). This has been suggested in dicta by the Tax Court in The Gray
Processes Corp., 43 B.TA. 624, aff'd per curiam, 122 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1941). See also Note,
67 YALE L.J. 112, 119 n.34 (1957); cf. Sneed, A Defense of the Tax Court's Result in
Prunier and Casale, 43 CoRN.uL L.Q. 339, 344 n.11 (1958).
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Thus, the additional cost of his new interest is added to the basis of his
stock. Of course, if the corporation makes a payment from past accumu-
lations, there is no dividend to the remaining shareholder"' and nothing
is added to the basis of the stock for this distribution. 47
A problem arises when one of the remaining shareholders sells his
stock prior to the time that the corporation has made full payment for
the redemption. At this point he may have had to recognize some divi-
dend income and he thereby would have increased his basis, but not to
the full extent of the price (not yet fully paid) for the redeemed stock.
One of two approaches may be taken.
First, a provision could have been added to the section which would
have required the remaining shareholder to recognize his gain from the
sale as ordinary income to the extent of his undistributed pro rata share
of the remainder of the payments. 4 " Or, secondly, the dividend treat-
ment could follow the shares. That is, whoever bought the stock would
be subject to dividend income upon payment of the price for the re-
deemed shares, if payment was made out of future earnings. The fact
that the buyer might be subject to this income would probably be re-
flected in the price he would be willing to pay for the stock. In effect,
the theory would be that the purchaser bought stock that was not fully
paid for and the corporation was making payments on the balance due.
The second suggestion seems the appropriate one. It may be argued,
however, that the purchaser was not a party to the transaction in which
the purchase was agreed upon. The theory underlying the proposed
section is that the corporate entity should be pierced because of the
146. Section 316x(1)(b).
147. Only the amount of the distribution taxable to the remaining shareholders under
§ 316x is added to the basis of the stock. Section 316x(3). The distribution will reduce the
basis of the stock. See the text following note 151 infra.
148. E.g., a section something like this:
If stock is sold by a remaining shareholder before complete payment has been made
for the redemption by the corporation, then the amount of money or property
received in excess of the basis of the stock shall constitute ordinary income to the
extent of the shareholder's pro rata share of the distribution that would be attributed
to him under subparagraph (1) [of § 316x] (assuming all payments were made
out of future earnings) had he held the stock until the full redemption price was
paid. Any excess over this amount shall be considered in exchange for the stock.
Of course, this penalizes the remaining shareholder who sells his stock, because he has ordinary
income even though subsequently the payments are made out of past rather than future
accumulations. A provision could be added giving him a deduction from income in subsequent
years if payments are from past accumulations. But this would require him to keep in
contact with the operations of a corporation in which he has no interest. It could be pro-
vided that he only has to recognize ordinary income to the extent of future earnings in the
year of the sale. This would provide, at least, a formal escape for those seeking to avoid
the section. They could have a third party buy the stock; there would then be a redemption
of the seller's stock. The third party would then sell the stock to the party who really sought
to purchase the shares. This would be done before there were any future accumulations.
Unless the court pierced the transaction, the applicability of the section would be avoided.
Compare generally § 306 with the provision suggested above.
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agreement among the remaining shareholders to use corporate earnings
to make the purchase. The buyer was never a party to this agreement
and, therefore, why should he and the corporation be considered as one?
The contrary argument is that the buyer is being attributed with
dividends not because he was a party to the agreement, but rather, be-
cause the tax incidents created by his vendor's activities attach to the
stock. He is buying, in reality, stock that has not been fully paid for
and, therefore, he is subject to dividend income when the corporation
makes payments on the unpaid balance.
There is no specific provision in the proposed section to effectuate
this suggested result. This is partly due to the fact that the author is
not fully convinced of the second alternative, and in part to the author's
hope that the courts would reach this conclusion on their own. That is, that
a reasoned analysis in the context of the proposed section would in proper
situations, require this result.
Finally, what effect will the application of the section have on
earnings and profits? Section 301x brings distributions made in redemp-
tion of stock in a purchase context within the general dividend section
of the Code.149 The distribution would, therefore, come within the
general rule of section 312, and earnings and profits would be reduced
accordingly. 15 Because the distribution is in the form of a payment for
a redemption, this would not require any additional deduction from
earnings and profits pursuant to section 312(e). This result is strength-
ened by the provision in section 316x(5), which provides that when a
redemption is found to be within its confines, section 302 shall not be
applicable. Thus, there would not be two deductions from earnings and
profits since the distribution already was given dividend treatment. 15'
Further, by bringing the distribution in payment of the stock within
section 301, the basis of the remaining shareholder's stock would be
reduced by any payments out of past rather than future earnings.
5 2
This is in harmony with the concept of the proposal as the distribution
out of past accumulations would be a partial liquidation of the remain-
ing shareholder's investment. Any distribution not out of future earn-




151. There apparently would be no difficulty on the corporate level if the distribution
was in kind. That is, whether the transaction was viewed as a redemption or a dividend,
the corporation would not have to recognize gain or loss on the distribution. Section 311;
Treas. Reg. § 1.311-1(a) (1955).
152. Section 301(c) (2).
153. Section 301(c) (3) (A).
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C. The Accumulated Earnings Tax
The 1954 Code does provide another method of taxing the funds
used to redeem the stock acquired in a purchase transaction.1'5  An ac-
cumulated earnings tax is imposed on a corporation "availed of for the
purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders...
by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being ...
distributed."' 55 This provision, when applicable, would tax the accumu-
lation of earnings used to purchase the redeemed stock at the corporate
rather than the shareholder level.' The treatment in individual cases
of funds accumulated to redeem a selling shareholder's stock in a close
corporation has not been clearly delineated. 57 However, if the distribu-
tion of future earnings is attributed to the remaining shareholder in
accordance with the proposed statutory section, there would be no basis
for an application of the accumulated earnings tax to these funds as
they could not be considered as having been used to avoid the tax to the
shareholders on dividends.158
IV. CONCLUSION
The tax incidents to the remaining shareholders in the examples
set forth in the introduction'59 to this article will be considered in refer-
ence to the proposed section and the present state of the law.
In the first example, the redemption of Gimmee's stock would be
from earnings accumulated prior to the redemption. Thus, under the
proposed section, Grab would have no dividend consequences upon pay-
ment for the stock. According to the present state of the law, again,
Grab would have no dividend consequences.' 60




157. Compare Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1958),
uith Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960). See
Herwitz, Stock Redemptions and the Accumulated Earnings Tax, 74 HARV. L. REV. 866
(1961).
158. Herwitz, supra note 157. The author distinguishes between accumulations in antici-
pation of the redemption and accumulations subsequent to the redemption to pay the
obligations incurred in making the redemption. His position is that the subsequent accumu-
lations present a stronger case against finding the earnings accumulated for the proscribed
purpose. Pursuant to the approach suggested in this article, the payment for the redemption
from subsequently accumulated earnings would give rise to dividends to the remaining share-
holders. However, the problems and considerations involved in each question are, to some
extent, different. For the purpose of the accumulated earnings tax the corporation keeps its
separate existence, i.e., the corporation is being availed of to avoid the surtax on shareholders.
Whereas in the approach suggested in this article the corporation loses its independent status
as the corporate veil is pierced. When this occurs there will be a distribution to the remain-
ing shareholders. Thus, the shareholders will pay tax on the dividend income, but the
corporation will not have to pay the penalty tax on improper accumulations.
159. See I(A) of this article's text supra.
160. See II(D) of this article's text supra.
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In example two, in which Gimmee is paid for his stock in notes of
the corporation, Grab would have dividend income in the years that
payments were made on the notes to the extent of the income earned
subsequent to the 1963, taxable year.' 16 Under present law it would ap-
pear that there would be no dividend income to Grab in this situation.'62
In the transaction in which Grab and Gimmee sell the corporation
to Friendly, there would be dividend income to Friendly, to the extent
of 45,000 dollars, assuming that there were sufficient earnings sub-
sequent to 1963. Thus, in examples three and four, the remaining share-
holder would have dividend income under the proposed section in the
year in which payments were made on the notes whether or not the
payments were to Grab and Gimmee or to independent creditors. Under
the present state of the law the apparent result would be that Friendly
would have no dividend income as a result of the transaction. 168
161. This assumes that the agreement to purchase and the redemption took place in
1963.
162. See H(D) of this article's text supra; but see Robert Deutsch, 38 T.C. 118 (1962).
163. See H(C) of this article's text supra. The Tax Court's recent decision in the
Deutsch case throws some doubt on this. See discussion following note 70 in this article's
text supra.
